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Notes
Jury Selection: The Need for Statutory
Reform in Minnesota
I. INTRODUCTION
In most instances, an individual confronted with the adminis-
tration of justice through the judicial process is guaranteed the
opportunity to have his cause considered by an impartial jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.1 The con-
stitutional guarantee extends to both the grand jury which in-
dicts and the petit jury which sits as the trier of fact.2  Congress
and the state legislatures have the responsibility of implementing
this fundamental guarantee. In Minnesota, however, the stat-
utory provisions which govern jury selection, while perhaps
satisfying the bare constitutional mandate, are deficient in many
crucial respects.
Starting with the basic premise that jury selection statutes
should reduce to an absolute minimum the opportunities for dis-
crimination and prejudice in the selection process, this Note will
attempt to expose the flaws in Minnesota's statutory scheme.
It will focus exclusively on the inadequacies of the statutory
provisions which control the initial selection processes,3 and
1. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII, XIV. See also Mn. CoxsT. art.
I, §§ 4, 6, 7.
2. See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 352, 362 (1939), where the
Court noted: "Principles which forbid discrimination in the selection
of Petit Juries also govern the selection of Grand Juries."
A grand jury has been defined as:
[A] body of men or women, or both, returned at stated periodsfrom the citizens of the county before a court of competent ju-
risdiction, chosen by lot, and sworn to inquire as to public
offenses committed or triable in the county...
Min-. STAT. § 628.41 (1967). See also BLAcK's LAw DIcTEONARY 993 (4th
ed. 1968). The function of the grand jury is twofold. It protects
the general interests of society by inquiring into the commission of
erines, and it stands as a buffer between the state acting through the
prosecutor and the individual. State v. Iosue, 220 Minn. 283, 19 N.W.2d
735 (1945).
A petit jury, on the other hand, is:
... a body of twelve men or women, or both, inpaneled and
sworn in the district court to try and determine, by a true and
unanimous verdict, any question or issue of fact in a civil or
criminal action or proceeding, according to the law and the
evidence as given them in court.
Mimx. STAT. § 593.01 (1967). See also BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 994
(4th ed. 1968).
3. For the purposes of this Note initial selection processes are
defined as those actions by which names of prospective grand and petit
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emphasis will be placed on the constitutional implications of
those deficiencies. In addition, the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 will be examined and compared with pres-
ent Minnesota statutes. It will be argued that the Federal Act
has solved many of the jury selection problems of the federal
judiciary, and that the approach embodied in that Act should be
adopted in Minnesota to eliminate the inadequacies of the cur-
rent statutory provisions.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF JURY SELECTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part: ". . . [T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
the district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... -4
The right to trial before an impartial jury guaranteed by this
amendment is directly applicable against the federal government
and has been held to apply against the states through the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.5
The central function of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment is to guarantee every individual a fair trial.0
While the trial need not be before a jury,7 if a jury is used it
jurors are obtained and placed on the master lists from which particu-
lar panels are ultimately drawn. This Note will not consider the
means by which jurors are drawn for a particular panel nor subse-
quent voir dire procedures.
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Minnesota Con-
stitution contains a substantially identical provision. Mum. CoNsT.
art. I, § 6.
5. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also 53
M nu. L. REV. 414 (1968). But see Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288
(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937); Wagner Elec.
Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923); New York Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).
6. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), where the
Court stated:
Fundamental too in the concept of due process and so in that
of liberty, is the thought that condemnation shall be rendered
only after trial.... The hearing, moreover, must be a real
one, not a sham or a pretense.
See also Scott, The Supreme Court's C'ontrol over State and Federal
Criminal Juries, 34 IowA L. REv. 577, 579 (1949).
7. The Supreme Court has often noted in dicta that the states
could abolish trial by jury. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324 (1937); cases cited following Palko v. Connecticut in note 5
supra. See also Scott, supra note 6, at 580; Note, The Defendant's
Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing,
Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920 n.9 (1965).
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 319 U.S. 145 (1968), however, the Court held
that the sixth amendment requires the states to afford a jury trial
to all criminal defendants except when offenses which may be cate-
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must be fairly and impartially drawn.8 To be violative of due
process, jury selection procedures must be found to lack that
measure of fundamental fairness deemed implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.9
In order to establish a violation of due process, absent a
correlative violation of equal protection, 0 an individual must
prove that the discrimination in the selection of jurors hearing
his case was arbitrary and intentional." If the individual is a
gorized as "petty" are involved or when the defendant has waived ajury trial. It has been asserted that the decision in Duncan does not
significantly affect the present right to jury trial in Minnesota. See
53 MiNx. L. REv. 414, 417-18 (1968). The basis for the assertion is
that Minnesota currently provides for a jury trial in all criminal prose-
cutions under state statutes except those involving municipal police reg-
ulations or ordinances. Id. at 418. See also State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn.
173, 177, 79 N.W.2d 136, 139 (1956). But see State v. Hoben, 256 Minn.
346, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959); Mum. STAT. § 484.63 (1967) (jury trial avail-
able on appeal to district court).
8. Comment, 1967 DuKE L.J. 346. See also Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957).
9. This criterion was enunciated in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937), as a test for determining whether provisions of the first eight
amendments should be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment,
thereby making them applicable against the states. See also Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). Its most
recent Supreme Court articulation appears in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), where the Court stated:
Of each of these determinations that a constitutional provision
originally written to bind the Federal Government should bind
the States as well it might be said that the limitation in ques-
tion is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal
system that might be imagined but is fundamental in the
context of the criminal processes maintained by the American
States.
Id. at 150 n.14.
The process of incorporation of sixth amendment provisions into the
fourteenth amendment pursuant to the enunciated criterion has been a
gradual process. It was once thought that none of the provisions of the
sixth amendment applied against the states. See West v. Louisiana, 194
U.S. 258, 264 (1904). The Supreme Court, however, in Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967), noted an increasing willingness in recent
years to look to the specific guarantees of the sixth amendment to see
if due process had been afforded a defendant. See, e.g., Washington v.
Texas, supra (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
supra (confrontation of witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (as-
sistance of counsel); In re Oliver, supra (public trial). This trend re-
cently culminated in Duncan v. Louisiana, supra (right to jury trial).
10. For a general discussion of the requirements of due process of
law and the incorporation of the equal protection clause into those
requirements, see Note, supra note 7, at 936-40.
11. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284, 294 (1947).
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
member of the excluded class, the prejudicial effect of the dis-
crnimination will be presumed under the "same class" rule.12 If,
on the other hand, he is not a member of the excluded class,
he must also prove that the discrimination against that class
prejudicially affected his case.' 3
The equal protection clause, in the jury selection context
as in other areas, simply guarantees every individual equal stand-
ing before the law.'4 It requires that selection classifications be
reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose.15 That purpose
is usually expressed in terms of obtaining competent jurors. If
the statutory classifications are so related, the fact that they
may exclude large portions of the general public from consider-
ation for jury service is constitutionally immaterial. 6 Classifi-
12. The "same class rule" has been formulated as follows:
If the defendant is a member of the race or other class ex-
cluded the danger of prejudice is great enough so that we will
condemn the exclusion without looking for actual prejudice; but
if he is not a member of the excluded race or class the danger
is not so great, and before we will condemn the exclusion
as unconstitutional we must find that the defendant was ac-
tually prejudiced.
Note, supra note 7, at 920. See also Scott, supra note 6, at 584, 592-94.
Scott, id. at 920 n.10, cites the following as examples of the "same class
rule": A white man cannot complain because Negroes have been ex-
cluded-Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E.2d 2 (1937); Common-
wealth v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22 (1880); State v. Dierlamn, 189 La. 544,
180 So. 135 (1938); State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 768 (1947); Barry v. State, 305 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Crim.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 851 (1957). But see _Alen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56,
137 S.E.2d 711 (1964). A Negro cannot complain because whites have
been excluded: Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942).
A man cannot complain because women have been excluded from
his jury: State v. Jones, 44 Del. 372, 57 A.2d 109 (1947); State v.
Taylor, 356 Mo. 1216, 205 S.W.2d 734 (1947). See also State v. Dilliard,
279 Minn. 414, 421, 157 N.W.2d 75, 80 (1968), where the court said in dic-
tun that a Negro physician could not complain about possible arbitrary
exclusion of low socio-economic classes from grand juries.
13. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Rawlins v. Georgia,
201 U.S. 638 (1906).
14. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947), where the
Court noted:
[A state cannot] . . . shunt a defendant before a jury so chosen
as greatly to lessen his chances while others accused of a like
offense are tried by a jury so drawn as to be more favorable
to them....
See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Bittker, The Case of
the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71
YALE L.J. 1387, 1406-07 (1962); Note, supra note 7.
15. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALip. L. REv. 341, 343-65 (1949).
16. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), where the
Supreme Court held that the selection procedures employed to obtain
[Vol. 53:977
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cations predicated upon race or color have been regarded as im-
mediately suspect.17
A prima facie case of violation of the equal protection clause
may be established by means of the "rule of exclusion."' 8 This
requires the complaining individual to demonstrate the existence
of a distinct class of citizens within his community,19 and to
establish the absence 2 or gross underrepresentation of that class
on past lists of prospective jurors.21 At that point the burden
shifts to the state and a prima facie case is made if the officials
responsible for selecting prospective jurors are unable to explain
the class's absence or gross underrepresentation on jury lists. 22
A violation of equal protection may also be established by a
jurors for the New York Special Jury did not violate equal protection.
Under those procedures the clerk of courts, acting pursuant to legis-
lative standards, administratively narrowed a panel of 60,000 names to
one of 3,000.
17. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See also Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
18. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 402 (1942); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S, 354, 361-62 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
397 (1880).
19. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
20. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (one Negro called for
jury service within memory); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)(no Mexican-American jurors within 25 years); Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463 (1947) (one Negro called in 30 years); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400 (1942) (no Negroes called for grand jury in 16 years).
21. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (42% of eligible
population and 27% of taxpayers on lists from which names were taken
were Negro, while only 9% of prospective jurors were Negro). But see
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (26% of eligible population were
Negroes, as were 10 - 15% of the venires); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953) (16% of eligible population were Negroes, as were 7 - 17% of the
venires). See also Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (25.8% of eligible population were Negro, as
were 4.9 - 16.1% of the venires); United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman,
304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963) (31% of
eligible population compared to 2% of venires); Mitchell v. Johnson, 250
F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (82% of eligible population compared to
35.7% of venires); Bass v. State, 254 Miss. 723, 182 So. 2d 591 (1966)
(42% of eligible population compared to 2% % of venires).
22. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947). See also
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1954), where the Court
pointed out that the "rule of exclusion" prima facie case cannot be
countered by generalities. Quoting from Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
598 (1935), the Court emphasized:
If ... the mere general assertions by [selection] officials of
their performance of duty were to be accepted as an adequate
justification for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury
service, the constitutional provision.., would be but a vain and
illusory requirement.
19691
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showing of discrimination in the selection of a particular jury list
or panel, notwithstanding the absence of discrimination in the
selection of past lists or panels. For example, testimony by
officials responsible for selection that they knew no members of
an excluded class and that only :personal acquaintances were
considered as prospective jurors may be sufficient to demonstrate
discrimination in the selection of a particular panel in violation
of the equal protection clause.23
Over the years a number of jury selection provisions and
procedures have been reviewed by the courts under the due proc-
ess and equal protection clauses. As a result, some general-
izations have emerged. Selection provisions or procedures which
provide for systematic or intentional exclusion from jury service
because of race, religion, social status, occupation, earning ca-
pacity or political affiliation have traditionally been regarded as
violative of the fourteenth amendment.24 The same view has
been taken of procedures which result in "token representa-
tion.125 Representation is deemed "token" when members of a
normally excluded class or group are intentionally included on
lists of prospective jurors in order to create a semblance of non-
discrimination.2 While token representation has been roundly
condemned, 27 the courts have recently recognized that conscious
awareness of race in extinguishing discrimination in the selection
of prospective jurors is permissible.28 The critical factor which
distinguishes inclusion based on conscious awareness of race from
token representation is simply the intent upon which the in-
clusion is premised. Allocation of the burden of establishing
this intent parallels the equal protection "rule of exclusion."
Where the rule applies, the state must establish a proper intent.29
23. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 239 (1950). See also Comment, 4
HousToN L. REV. 570, 575 (1966).
24. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (dicta as
to social status, occupation, earning capacity); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452 (C.C.E.D.
Ky. 1905) (political party affiliation); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim.
297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (Catholics).
25. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471 (1953). See also Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
27. Id.
28. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967). Contra, Collins v. Walker, 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964). See also Martin, The Fifth Circuit and
Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury,
4 HousTox L. REV. 448 (1966); Comment, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 364 (1967);
Comment, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 403 (1967).
29. See notes 18-22 supra, and accompanying text.
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In all other cases a discriminatory intent must be demonstrated
by the complaining individual.30
Finally, it should be noted that judicial approval of inclusion
based on a conscious awareness of race does not require com-
pliance with demands for precise proportional representation of
various segments of the community on lists of prospective jurors
or on particular panels.3 1 Such demands have never been re-
garded as within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.3 2
Even this rudimentary discussion of the due process and
equal protection clauses demonstrates that the available oppor-
tunities for discrimination and prejudice in the jury selection
process need not be reduced to an absolute minimum in order
for the selection process to comport with the constitutional safe-
guards.3 3  The more subtle and pervasive discriminatory prac-
tices are apparently beyond the scope of present interpretations
of equal protection and due process of law. It is submitted that
those practices can be eliminated only through the use of legis-
lative selection standards which are more precise than those
currently being applied pursuant to equal protection and due
process. The following examination of the Minnesota jury selec-
tion provisions and procedures will demonstrate how vague stat-
utory provisions afford opportunities for subtle discrimination
and prejudice in the jury selection process despite existing con-
stitutional safeguards.
III. THE MINNESOTA JURY SELECTION SYSTEM
A. INMODUcTION
The statutory provisions which control the initial jury selec-
tion processes in Minnesota are contained in Minnesota Statutes,
chapter 593.34 Section 593.13 sets out selection procedures for
30. See text accompanying notes 11-13 and 23 supra.
31. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954); Anderson v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 84(6th Cir. 1966); United States v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp. 130
(D.N.J. 1965).
33. See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1967). See also notes 11-13 & 19-23 supra, and
accompanying text, where it is indicated that the burden of establishing
defects in a selection system rests firmly on the individual.
34. M xN. STAT. §§ 593.13-.14 (1967).
The entire Minnesota jury system is established in two interrelated
blocks of statutes. The operation of the petit jury system is set out in
M mx. STAT. §§ 593.01-.21 (1967), and the operation of the grand jury
19691
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system in MInN. STAT. §§ 628.41-.58 (1967). The statutes are interre-
lated in that the selection procedures described in §§ 593.13-.14, the
exemptions from jury service detailed in § 628.43, and the grounds for
excuse from service in § 628.49 are applicable to both grand and petit
jurors.
This Note's discussion of the selection of prospective grand jurors
for both large and small counties in Minnesota must be considered in
light of the following caveat. In Minnesota, as in most states, a dual
system is available for filing charges against a criminal defendant.
MINN. STAT. §§ 628.01-.33 (1967). See also State v. Linehan, 276 Minn.
349, 150 N.W.2d 203 (1967). One method is for the grand jury to return
an indictment or presentment against a particular defendant. An in-
dictment is usually framed by the prosecuting attorney and pre-
sented by him for acceptance or rejection by the grand jury. A
presentment is an accusation made by the grand jury on its own mo-
tion, based upon either its own observation or knowledge, or upon evi-
dence presented to it. MAiNw. STAT. § 628.01 (1967); BLAcK's LAW DIc-
TIONARY 912 (4th ed. 1968). At least two significant aspects of the use
of a grand jury must be recognized. First, a grand jury proceeding is
secret, MNnl. STAT. §§ 628.64-.68 (1967), and usually is limited to a
presentation of prosecution's side of the case, MIN. STAT. § 628.59
(1967). An indictment is returned if that evidence would war-
rant conviction. MINN. STAT. § 628.03 (1967). Second, the decision
to employ a grand jury to obtain an indictment is largely within the
discretion of the prosecuting attorney. A grand jury is required only in
cases where the possible punishment is life imprisonment. See Op.
nmw. ATT. GEN., 260-B. Oct. 29, 1952. In all other cases a prosecut-
ing attorney may resort to the second method of filing criminal charges
against a particular defendant. He, or in some cases the trial court,
ImN. STAT. § 628.32 (1967), may file an information accusing the de-
fendant of a crime. Although the indictment and information serve
the same purpose, State v. Owens, 268 Minn. 321, 129 N.W.2d 284
(1964), there are several obvious distinctions. The most significant
is that before an information can be filed the suspect must nor-
mally be afforded a preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace
or examining magistrate. MINN. STAT. § 628.31 (1967). The hearing
can be waived, however, by the defendant. State ex rel. Webber v.
Tahash, 277 Minn. 302, 152 N.W.2d 497 (1967). In addition, its denial may
be considered non-prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Linehan, supra;
State ex rel. Miletich v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 505, 148 N.W.2d 134 (1967).
The ostensible purpose of the hearing is to determine whether there is
probable cause to hold the suspect. The presiding magistrate has the
authority to hear evidence, rule on admissibility, and discharge the
suspect in the absence of a sufficient showing by the state. State v.
Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288, 143 N.W.2d 212 (1966). Although the state is
not required to reveal all its evidence, State ex rel. Hastings v. Bailey,
263 Minn. 261, 116 N.W.2d 548 (1962), the hearing often affords the
accused and his counsel an important opportunity to discover the basis
and strength of the prosecution's case. This opportunity is not avail-
able when a grand jury is considering returning an indictment. Con-
sequently, it can be argued that a grand jury is resorted to only when it
is required or when the prosecuting attorney wishes to avoid revealing
his case.
It is the position of this Note that the availability of an alternative
to the grand jury in no way detracts from the argument that a grand
jury, when used, should be fairly and impartially drawn. Indeed, the
argument is reinforced by the fact that the grand jury will probably
be used only when the crime involves the severest punishment Min-
[Vol. 53:977
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counties where the population is less than 100,000, 35 and section
593.14 specifies different procedures for larger counties. 86 This
nesota permits and/or when the prosecutor wishes to avoid disclosing
the basis of his case. In such cases an impartially drawn grand jury
would appear to be one of the most fundamental safeguards initially
available to the accused.
35. Mimnr. STAT. § 593.13 (1967), provides in part:
Subd. 1. In all counties having a population of less than
100,000 the selection of qualified persons whose names are
placed on the jury lists of each county shall be by a jury com-
mission, said commission to be comprised of the clerk of dis-
trict court of each county, the chairman of the county board of
the county, and a resident of the county as appointed by the
chief judge of the judicial district, said resident being designated
the court appointed commissioner. The court appointed com-
missioner shall serve at the will of the chief judge of the dis-
trict, and shall be designated the chairman of the jury commis-
sion.
Subd. 2. The jury commission, at a meeting to be called
by the court appointed commissioner in January of each
year, shall select 72 persons to serve as grand jurors and one
name for each 100 persons residing in said county at the last
federal census to serve as petit jurors. Provided however, that
no less than 150 persons shall be selected to serve as petitjurors. Selection of grand and petit jurors shall be from the
qualified voters of the county and taken from either the election
register of those who voted in the last election in said county,
or from the voter registration file where permanent registration
systems are maintained. At the request of the jury commis-
sion the county auditor and the city, village and town clerks
shall make available to the commission for its use their voting
registers and registration lists.
Subd. 3. In selecting said names, the commissioners, be-
ginning with the court appointed commissioner, shall each al-
ternately place one name i a box to be known as the jury
box, until the required number of names are contained therein.Separate lists of such names as are contained in said box and
of the names selected to serve as grand jurors shall be 
cer-
tified a d signed by the chairman of the jury commission and
forthwith delivered to the clerk of court.
Subd. 4. In counties where the population exceeds 10,000,
no person on such list drawn for service shall be placed on the
next succeeding annual list, and the clerk of court shall certify to
the jury commission, at its annual January session, the names
on the last annual list not drawn for service during the preced-
ing year, nor shall any juror at any one term serve more than
30 days and until the completion of the case upon which he may
be sitting. The court may, with the consent of any such juror
and with the consent of any parties having matters for trial,
after such 30-day period has expired, hold and use such jurors
so consenting to try and determine any jury cases remaining
to be tried at such term between parties so consenting ....
36. MN . SuAT. § 593.14 (1967), provides in part:Subd. 1. In all counties having a populatioe of more than
100,000, judges of the district court, or a majority thereof, of the
district embracing such county or counties shall, annua fly, inthe month of December of each year, at the courthouse in such
county, select crom the qualified electors of the county 125
persons properly qualified to serve as grand jurors, and 2,00
persons properly qualified to serve as petit jurors, and shall
make out and certify separate lists thereof, and for th de-
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legislative determination that the population of the county
should determine the appropriate selection procedure was sus-
tained at an early date by the Minnesota Supreme Court.3 7
B. JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN SPARSELY POPULATED
COUNTIES UNDER SECTION 593.13
Section 593.13 places responsibility for the selection of pro-
spective grand and petit jurors for sparsely populated counties in
the hands of a jury commission.8 The commission is composed
of the clerk of district court for the county, a commissioner
appointed by the district court, and the chairman of the county
board of commissioners.39 The section requires the commission-
ers to select the names of 72 qualified voters as prospective grand
jurors,40 and the name of one qualified voter for every 100 per-
sons in the county as prospective petit jurors.41 The section
liver such lists to the clerk of the district court of the county;
and from these lists of persons to serve as grand jurors and as
petit jurors shall, respectively, be drawn all grand jurors and
petit jurors at any time required for the transaction of business
in the district court of such county . . . (emphasis added).
37. In State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365, 98 N.W. 190 (1904), these selec-
tion procedures were attacked as unconstitutional class legislation. The
court stated:
[T]he classification is not arbitrary, and is not based upon
existing circumstances only, but has reference to a condition
which, in the opinion of the legislators, exists in largely popu-
lated counties. The object to be attained was a method of
selecting the best possible class of citizens to act in the capac-
ity of jurors, and there is a reasonable foundation for the dis-
tinction made by the legislature in giving the selection of
names from which the jurors should be taken to the judges of
the court in counties of large population .... It may be rea-
sonably asserted that the larger the county, the greater the op-
portunity for unwholesome influence in the selection of the jury
list.
Id. at 371-72, 98 N.W. at 194. See also In re Jury Panel Selected for
Dakota County, 276 Minn. 503, 150 N.W.2d 863 (1967), where the court
stated in dictum:
The legislature obviously intended that the largest counties
should have a different method of jury selection, both as to
the method of selection and the numbers of jurors selected. It
was deemed advisable to identify such counties by population
rather than name, a common method of classification.
Id. at 507, 150 N.W.2d at 866.
38. MxmNN. STAT. § 593.13(1) (1967). See note 35 supra, for the
text of the subdivision.
39. Id. The county board of commissioners is the elected govern-
ing body of the county. See 1wN. STAT. § 375.01 (1967).
40. AMUN. STAT. § 593.13(2) (1967). See note 35 supra, for the
text of the subdivision. See also note 34 supra.
41. Id. Under this procedure a minimum of 150 names must be
placed on the lists of prospective petit jurors.
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further provides that the names of the prospective grand and
petit jurors must be obtained either from the register of persons
who voted in the last election or from lists of persons properly
registered to vote.42 The section does not, however, specify the
precise manner in which the names are to be extracted from the
source lists. 43 It merely prohibits the jury commissioners from
placing the names of persons who actually rendered jury service
the preceding year on current source lists.44
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on the constitutionality of these provisions under the due process
or equal protection clauses, a recent decision based upon the
section as it stood prior to revision by the 1967 legislature
sheds some light on how the court would handle these questions.
In State ex rel. Bush v. Tahash45 an Indian defendant asserted a
violation of due process on the ground that the jury which con-
victed him was the product of a selection system which discrimi-
nated against members of the Indian race.46 The county's petit
jury venires revealed that for a three year period five and one-
third per cent of the persons on the venires were of Indian
extraction.47 Although defendant asserted that Indians repre-
sented approximately 12 per cent of the general population of
the county, he failed to assert or establish what percentage were
qualified voters and thus eligible for jury service.48 The court
concluded:
The selection of jurors from a list of qualified voters is consti-
tutionally permissible, and the fact that a definable class of per-
sons represents a higher proportion of the population as a whole
than it does of those qualified to vote does not invalidate a sys-
tem of selection.49
42. AD=. STAT. § 593.13(2) (1967). See note 35 supra, for the
text of the subdivision.
43. Mnn. STAT. § 593.13(3) (1967). See note 35 supra, for the
text of the subdivision. See also note 61 infra, and accompanying text
for a discussion of the impact of this subdivision's vagueness.
44. M.iN. STAT. § 593.13(4) (1967). See note 35 supra, for the
text of the subdivision. This prohibition does not apply to counties
where the population is less than 10,000. Id.
45. - Minn. , 161 N.W.2d 326 (1968).
46. Id. at _, 161 N.W.2d at 329.
47. Id. at _ 161 N.W.2d at 328. A stipulation on evidence pro-
vided: The list for 1961 contained eight people of Indian extraction, or
51/% of 150 names; the list for 1962 contained seven people of Indian
extraction, or 4% % of 150 names; the list for 1963 contained 9 people
of Indian extraction, or 6% of 150 names. See also Brief for Respondent
at 3, Brief for Appellant at 4.
48. See note 47 supra.
49. - Minn. , _, 161 N.W.2d 327, 328 (1968). The court but-
tressed this conclusion by noting that the only qualifications for voting in
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The court, relying upon Swain v. AZabama50 and apparently
assuming that all Indians in the county were qualified voters,
further concluded that the disparity between the percentage of
Indians in the general population and the percentage on jury lists
was not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a prima facie case
of invidious discrimination.51
While the soundness of the court's decision in this case can-
not be doubted under standard constitutional doctrines, the
breadth of the provisions of section 593.13 under which the case
arose should be noted.5 2 For example, under the section as it
then stood the officials responsible for jury selection could ob-
tain the names of prospective jurors from any source and could
choose by means of any mechanical selection procedure they
deemed appropriate.53 The only limitation was that the persons
included had to be qualified voters.54 The section did not im-
pose any restrictions upon exclusion from jury service.55  Thus,
the provisions under which the Bush case was decided vested
almost absolute discretion in the officials responsible for jury
selection and certainly afforded opportunities for both blatant
and subtle discrimination and prejudice in the selection process.
Even though the present provisions of section 593.13 are more
precise than those under which Bush arose,56 there is no reason
Minnesota are age, United States citizenship and residency in a Minne-
sota election precinct. The right to vote is not dependent upon economic
status or payment of taxes. Id. See also Mnhx. STAT. § 200.02 (1965).
50. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
51. For cases demonstrating the disparity required to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination, see note 21 supra, and accompany-
ing text.
52. MNN. STAT. § 593.13 (1947), provided in part:
The county board, at its annual session in January, shall
select, from the qualified voters of the county, 72 persons to
serve as grand jurors, and 144 persons to serve as petit jurors,
and make separate lists thereof, which shall be certified and
signed by the chairman, attested by the auditor, and forthwith
delivered to the clerk of the district court. If in any county the
board is unable to select the required number, the highest prac-
ticable number shall be sufficient. No person on such list drawn
for service shall be placed on the next succeeding annual list,
and the clerk shall certify to the board, at its annual January
session, the names on the last annual list not drawn for service
during the preceding year, nor shall any juror at any one term
serve more than 30 days and until the completion of the case
upon which he may be sitting.
53. Id.
54. Id. Presumptively, it was only necessary to be a qualified
voter at the time of selection.
55. Id.
56. Compare Mnm. STAT. § 593.13 (1967), note 35 supra, with
An~m. STAT. § 593.13 (1947), note 52 supra.
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to suspect that the court would resolve the constitutional ques-
tions of the case any differently under the current provisions.
At least two of the present provisions of section 593.13 afford
opportunities for discrimination and prejudice in the selection of
prospective grand and petit jurors. First, the section specifically
requires that prospective jurors' names be obtained from source
lists that are intimately related to the franchise.57 While the
use of such lists is a natural corollary to the requirement that
jurors must be "qualified voters,"5 8 the permissible uses of the
lists under present provisions of section 593.13 present some dif-
ficulties. The fact that the statute does not go beyond mere
specification of source lists allows officials to afford dispropor-
tionate representation to particular segments of the county be-
cause of geographical concentration and governmental subdivi-
sion. For example, counties are subdivided into lesser govern-
mental units including townships, cities, villages and towns, and
the source lists specified in section 593.13 are maintained at the
lower levels. 0 Under the section, jury commissioners are not
required to have the source lists from all lesser governmental
subdivisions at their disposal when they select the names of the
prospective jurors. Moreover, even if the commissioners have
all the lists in their possession, they are not required to use all of
them. Thus it appears that jury commissioners are free to select
prospective jurors from exclusively urban or exclusively rural
segments of the county.60
Another, and related problem with section 593.13 is its am-
biguity with respect to the manner in which names and pro-
spective jurors are to be extracted from the specified source lists.
The section provides:
In selecting said names, the commissioners, beginning with the
court appointed commissioner, shall each alternately place one
57. MiNN. STAT. § 593.13(2) (1967). See note 35 supra for the
text of the subdivision.
58. Id.
59. M=N. STAT. § 201.02 (1967).
60. Other than the provisions specifying the source lists, the only
pertinent provision provides:
At the request of the jury commission the county auditor and
the city, village and town clerks shall make available to the
commission for its use their voting registers and registration
lists.
M_.n. STAT. § 593.13 (2) (1967). See note 35 supra for the text of
the entire subdivision. This provision appears to be directory only and
vests complete responsibility in the commissioners for obtaining and
using all of the source lists.
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name in a box to be known as the jury box, until the required
number of names are contained therein .... 61
This provision is amenable to two possible interpretations.
First, it may be read as simply specifying the order in which the
commissioners must select the names of prospective jurors. If
this is the correct construction, the provision would appear to be
of limited utility. Although it would ensure that each com-
missioner selects the same number of prospective jurors, it would
still apparently leave each commissioner free to pick and choose
from the names on the source lists at his discretion. The pro-
vision could also be construed to require the commissioners to
extract names in accordance with the order in which they appear
on the lists; for example, it might mean that every other, or
every third name must be selected for prospective jury service.
This construction would eliminate the commissioners' discretion
to pick and choose freely from the list and to exclude qualified
voters arbitrarily on the basis of personal prejudice or bias. If
this second construction was the one intended by the legislature,
it is submitted that the provision is so ambiguously drawn that
that intent will not be implemented. In the absence of a defini-
tive judicial interpretation, the provision merely compounds
present uncertainty in the area of jury selection for sparsely
populated counties. The potential for abuse of source lists and
the ambiguity in the mechanics provision of section 593.13 could
and should be eliminated. Mandatory selection from consoli-
dated source lists would eliminate the former and a simple
clarification could convert the mechanics provision into a useful
safeguard.
C. JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN DENSELY POPULATED
COUNTIES UNDER SECTION 593.14-HENNEPN COUNTY
The provisions of section 593.14 govern the initial jury selec-
tion processes in counties whose populations exceed 100,000. The
statute vests complete responsibility for obtaining prospective
grand and petit jurors in the district court judges.62 In Henne-
61. _mx. STAT. § 593.13(3) (1967) (emphasis added). This pro-
vision was inserted into the section by the 1967 legislature. Prior to
that time there was no mention of selection mechanics. Compare text
of IVN. STAT. § 593.13 (1967), note 35 supra, with text of MINN. STAT.
§ 593.13 (1947), note 52 supra.
62. MINN. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1967). See note 36 supra for the
text of the subdivision. It should be noted that the provisions of
this section relating to the initial selection process were not modified
by the 1967 legislature. Compare Mum. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1967), note
36 supra, with MlmNN. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1947).
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pin County, 3 the judges have developed different systems for
selecting prospective petit as opposed to grand jurors.
Under section 593.14 the district court judges are required
to select the names of 2,000 "qualified electors" as prospective
petit jurors.6 4 In practice, approximately 11,600 names are se-
lected.6 5 In Hennepin County these names are currently ob-
tained from three source lists: rural polling lists, polling lists
from towns and villages in the county, and the Minneapolis City
Directory.60 The selection procedure can be described as follows:
At a November meeting of Hennepin County's 16 district court
judges, each judge is assigned a portion of the source lists. Each
then selects approximately 400 names from the directory and 325
names from the other lists. Individuals who are statutorily
exempted or disqualified from jury service are excluded. From
the resulting master lists, petit jurors are drawn for service.67
Section 593.14 further requires the judges to select 125
"qualified electors" as prospective grand jurors for Hennepin
County. 8 The system developed by the judges to select these
jurors has been characterized as a "personal selection system."69
At a November meeting each district court judge submits the
names of from nine to 11 friends and acquaintances for con-
sideration as grand jurors for the following year. In making
these suggestions each judge purportedly considers the intelli-
gence, common sense, stability, and fitness for jury service pos-
sessed by each suggested juror. Walk of life and geographical
situs in the community are allegedly not considered. The judges
then discuss the suggested names with the object of discovering
duplicate suggestions and eliminating either exempted indi-
viduals or those who are personally objectionable to any of the
judges.70 From the agreed-upon list of prospective grand jurors
63. Because of the limited availability of source materials, the
major emphasis of this Note with regard to section 593.14 will be di-
rected at Hennepin County, to the exclusion of other large counties to
which the section also applies.
64. MiNN. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1967). See note 36 supra, for the
text of the subdivision.
65. State v. Dillard, 279 Minn. 414, 416, 157 N.W.2d 75, 77 (1968).
66. Id. at 416, 157 N.W.2d at 77.
67. Id.
68. Mnn=. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1967). See note 36 supra, for the
text of the subdivision. See also note 34 supra.
69. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v. Dilliard, 279 Minn. 414, 157
N.W.2d 75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
70. State v. Dilliard, 279 Minn. 414, 416-17, 157 N.W.2d 75, 76
(1968). See also Brief for Appellant at 2.
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
46 are ultimately drawn for service.71
This personal selection system was recently sustained by the
Minnesota Supreme Court on constitutional grounds. In State v.
Dilliard a Negro physician challenged his indictment by a Henne-
pin County grand jury.72 The defendant attacked the personal
selection system on two grounds. ].Ie urged first that the system
embodies an inherent tendency toward discrimination in that a
prospective juror's race and socio-economic status are necessarily
This personal selection system is merely a variation of the "key
man" system which has historically been widely used to obtain prospec-
tive jurors for the federal court system. Lindquist, An Analysis of
Juror Selection Procedure in the United States District Courts, 41
TsnVp. L.Q. 32, 33 n.8 (1967), indicates that as many as 46% of the federal
judicial districts have relied exclusively on key man systems and ap-
proximately 22% have used the system in conjunction with other sources
to obtain prospective jurors. Under the key man system, prominent
members of the community provide cfficials with lists of individuals
for prospective jury service. Thus, the key men act as screening agents
and suggest the names of only those individuals whom they believe are
competent to render serice. Under the system used to obtain grand
jurors in Hennepin County the district court judges act as both key
men and selection officials.
The key man system is most often criticized for its purported failure
to secure lists of jurors which fairly represent a cross-section of the
community. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
See also Brief for Appellant at 7. The thrust of this criticism has been
twofold. First, the key men themselves represent only a very narrow
segment of the community; and second, they may have failed to
acquaint themselves with other segments of the community. Despite the
obvious inadequacies of the key man system, as demonstrated by the
numerous cases which have found unconstitutional discrimination, see
cases cited immediately above, a survey of federal district court judges
reported in Lindquist, supra, at 44-45, indicated that most judges felt
that the system did produce a cross-section of the community. For con-
trasting views of reform of the key man and federal jury system com-
pare Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967),
with Erwin, Jury Reform Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132 (1967).
See generally The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409
(1960).
71. The final drawing process is relatively simple and fair. The
clerk of court transcribes the names from the master list to separate
pieces of paper, folds each piece, and places it in a box. When it be-
comes necessary to draw a panel, the clerk, in the presence of another
official, draws 23 names from the box. This process is repeated for
each grand jury that is impaneled. See Mlnvx. STAT. §§ 628.41, .45
(1967). See also State v. Dilliard, 279 Minn. 414, 415-16, 157 N.W.2d
75, 77 (1968).
72. A motion to quash the indictment charging illegal prescription
of narcotics was denied by the district court and the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the motion were certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court under MnIN. STAT. § 632.10 (1967). 279 Minn. at 415, 157 N.W.2d
at 75.
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considered in the selection process.7 3 Second, the defendant
urged that the system is unconstitutional because the selectors,
the district court judges, represent a very limited segment of the
community and as such are incapable of compiling a master list
comprising a fair cross-section of the community.7 4 In support
of his contentions, defendant demonstrated that few Negroes had
been placed on the master lists or selected to serve as grand
jurors over an extended period of time.7 5 He further showed a
distinct tendency toward exclusion of the lower socio-economic
segments of the county from prospective grand juror lists.7 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court responded to defendant's con-
tentions by holding that the personal selection system was not
constitutionally unsound and that the defendant had not estab-
lished any misuse of the system that was prejudicial to him.77
The court summarily dispensed with the claim that Negroes had
been systematically excluded from grand jury service by noting
that the number of Negroes on the venire from which the in-
dicting grand jury was drawn was roughly comparable to the Ne-
gro percentage of the population.7 8 Reliance was also placed on
the fact that in most exclusion cases the number of Negroes
selected was far below their proportion in the general popu-
73. See Brief for Appellant at 10-11. In making this argument
strong reliance was placed on the principle of color blindness estab-
lished by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Cases like
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950), and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400,
404 (1942), which had placed an affirmative duty on commissioners to
acquaint themselves with all segments of the community, and the deci-
sion in Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), which approved con-
scious awareness of race, were discarded as inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of Brown. Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
74. Brief for Appellant at 12-13. In making this argument appel-
lant relied on language in Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34(5th Cir. 1966), which he felt indicated that Rabinowitz had held key
man selection invalid. The court, relying on Mobley v. United States,
379 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1967), rejected this contention. State v. Dilliard,
279 Minn. 414, 421, 157 N.W.2d 75, 80 (1968). See also Comment, 4 Hous-
TON L. REv. 570 (1966).
75. From 1951 through 1966 only two Negroes served as grand ju-
rors; from 1951 through 1965 only two Negroes were on the lists of
prospective grand jurors; four were included in 1966. Brief for Ap-
pellant at 4.
76. For the statistical data supporting this contention see note 92
infra, and accompanying text.
77. State v. Dilliard, 279 Minn. 414, 420-21, 157 N.W.2d 75, 81 (1968).
78. Id. at 417, 157 N.W.2d at 77-78. The parties had stipulated
that Negroes represented approximately 2% of the population of the
county. See also 1960 CENsus OF PoPuLATioN, GENERAL PoPULATION
CmRAcrEmsTics: MINNESOTA, Table 13, at 25-41 (1961). The court ap-
parently disregarded the fact that during the 15 year period prior
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lation.7 9 The court felt that the percentage of Negroes in Henne-
pin County was so small that merely drawing the final grand
jury panel by lot could account for the rare service by Negroes.80
The court also rejected defendant's contention that lower
socio-economic classes had been unconstitutionally excluded
from consideration as grand jurors. While recognizing that such
exclusion-either intentional or because the judges were un-
acquainted with members of these classes-could not be con-
stitutionally justified, the court characterized defendant's statis-
tical occupational categorizations of persons on prior venires as
"practically worthless."81 This conclusion was premised on the
notion that some members of the excluded classes may have been
placed in imprecise occupational categories to which significant
percentages had been attributed.82 In short, the court felt that
defendant had failed to establish a case of socio-economic dis-
crimination. The court further emphasized in dicta that even if
such discrimination had been established by the offered proof,
the defendant lacked standing to challenge it because he was
not a member of the excluded class.8 3
While the decision in Dilliard may accord with established
constitutional doctrine,8 4 and while section 593.14 and the pro-
cedures for selecting grand and probably petit jurors have re-
ceived judicial approval, it seems clear that both the section and
selection procedures are seriously defective. In short, the avail-
able opportunities for discrimination and prejudice in the selec-
tion process have not been reduced to an absolute minimum in
Minnesota. An examination of the defects of section 593.14 and
the practical consequences of the selection procedures developed
by the district court judges thereunder will indicate that legis-
lative revision of the section is necessary.
to 1966, the percentage of Negroes on the master lists equaled only
5.3% of the total number that would have been included (37.5) had 2%
of the population been represented. This is particularly striking in view
of the total absence of any explanation of why the number suddenly
increased in 1966 and the lack of any assurance that the increase
would be retained in future years.
79. 279 Minn. at 418, 157 N.W.2d at 78.
80. Id. at 417, 157 N.W.2d at 78. See note 71 supra, for a descrip-
tion of the final drawing process.
81. 279 Minn. at 417, 157 N.W.2d at 77.
82. Id. at 417, 157 N.W.2d at 77; see note 92 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
83. Id. at 421, 157 N.W.2d at 80. See note 12 supra, for cases
reaching a similar result under the due process "same class" rule.
84. See notes 7-22 supra, and accompanying text.
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1. Selection of Petit Jurors Under Section 593.14
Section 593.14 vests the district court judges with complete
discretion in establishing selection procedures for prospective
petit jurors.8 5 Thus, the section leaves the judges free to
select prospective petit jurors from any sources, in any manner,
and upon consideration of any subjective criteria they choose.8 6
While some would argue that the judiciary would never engage
in discrimination, it is clear that the opportunity to do so exists
under the section. It may also be argued that the sheer number
of necessary selections and the limited information available to
the judges would impede any arbitrary or systematic discrimi-
nation. This argument, however, is not convincing. A lack of
information may itself result in non-representative jury lists,8 7
and even limited information may provide a basis for excluding
those particular segments of the community which a selection of-
ficial may find objectionable.8
In view of the wide potential for abuse afforded by section
593.14, the selection system devised and used by the district court
judges appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve jury lists
which represent a broad cross-section of the community. How-
ever, this is not to say that the selection procedures reduce the
available opportunities for discrimination and prejudice to an
absolute minimum. The practice of using source lists does not
by itself ensure that various economic, social or ethnic groups will
be represented on the final prospective juror lists. It is not
only possible that the source lists themselves may disproportion-
ately reflect elements of the county, but prospective jurors could
be selected from only particular elements represented on the
lists. This result could obtain because of the tendency toward
geographical concentration according to race and socio-economic
status and the fact that source lists are related to geographical
location.89 This danger may be overrated, however, since the
85. mINx. STAT. § 593.14(1) (1967). See note 36 supra, for the
text of the subdivision.
86. Id.
87. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), where the Supreme
Court indicated that because a lack of information may result in non-
representative jury lists, the officials responsible for selection are under
an affirmative duty to acquaint themselves with the various segments
of the community.
88. A mere name or address may indicate racial, socio-economic,
or ethnic class. If the opportunity to discriminate is present, even this
very limited information may provide a basis for arbitrary exclusion or
inclusion on prospective jury lists.
89. See note 66 supra, and accompanying text.
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current practices for selecting petit jurors in Hennepin County
include random allocation of source lists to the various judges
of the county.90
It is submitted that legislative action with regard to the
selection of prospective petit jurors under section 593.14 would
be desirable. Source lists and selection mechanics could easily
be designed to eliminate the present opportunities for discrimi-
nation and prejudice under section 593.14.
2. Selection of Grand Jurors Under Section 593.14
The "personal selection system" used to obtain prospective
grand jurors for Hennepin County under section 593.14, while
not constitutionally unsound,91 has produced some results which
are questionable on policy grounds. For example, the system
has resulted in the compilation of master lists and grand juries
composed of members of the highest socio-economic classes of
the county.9 2 This composition has recently been described as
follows:
... [F] or the past sixteen years approximately 40% of the per-
sons placed on the master lists were high corporate officers, and
S. .. only two persons could be considered "blue collar" or
hourly wage earners. No unskilled or common laborers during
90. See note 67 supra, and accompanying text.
91. See notes 72-84 supra, and accompanying text.
92. See Brief for Appellant at 3-4. See also State v. Dilliard, 279
Minn. 414, 416-17, 157 N.W.2d 75, 77 (1968), where the following statistics
for the 1966-67 grand jury venires for Hennepin County were cited:
Occupations Percentage on Venire
1. Corporate executive officers 37.0%
2. Self-employed 5.0%
3. Retired person-former 11.0%
occupations unknown
4. Union executives 13.0%
5. Educators 3.0%
6. Housewives 12.0%
7. Unskilled laborers 0.0%
8. Hourly wage earners 0.8%
9. Miscellaneous occupations 8.0%
10. Occupations unknown 10.0%
99.8%
While some of the above categories are imprecise, it should be noted
that if the vague ones, numbers 3, 9, and 10, are totaled, and that total,
29%, is categorized entirely as unskilled and hourly wage earners, the
percentage representation of those groups on the 1966-67 venire would
still be considerably less than the percentage of corporate executives on
the venire, and it would still be drastically less, 21% plus, than their
purported percentage representation in the adult population of the
county. See Brief for Appellant at 17, where that percentage was de-
scribed as "well over 50%."
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this period of time have been placed on the grand jury ven-
ires.93
If this description of grand jury venire compositon is even rea-
sonably accurate, a substantial question is raised as to whether
the resulting grand juries were able to inquire fairly into the
matters brought before them. At least one recent study demon-
strated that compositions of this sort produce prosecution-
oriented juries.9 4 Further, it would appear that such an orien-
tation would obtain regardless of whether the composition of the
venires was intentionally manipulated or was merely the inevi-
table result of a section which vests unlimited discretion in the
selection officials.
In Ballard v. United States,95 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that an alert blue collar worker or laborer may
be a more valuable and capable juror than a sluggish business
executive or educator. The Court stated: "Recognition must be
given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be
found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an in-
dividual rather than a group or class matter."9 6  The Minnesota
state legislature should also recognize that juror competence is
an individual matter and enact a selection system that would
eliminate the socio-economic imbalance that now exists in the
grand jury venires of Hennepin County.97 Such legislation
93. Brief for Appellant at 4.
94. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB.
L. REv. 744, 748 (1959), where it was pointed out that blue ribbon
jurors, which represent higher socio-economic groups, were more likely
to convict than other jurors. Admittedly there is a distinction between
the New York blue ribbon jury that was the subject of the study and
juries which result from the selection system in Hennepin County.
Nevertheless, the analogous socio-economic composition of lists of pro-
spective jurors makes the findings of the Chicago study relevant to the
selection of grand jurors in Hennepin County.
95. 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
96. Id. See also S. McCART, TRiAL By JuRY 25 (1964):
Intelligence and common sense are the important attributes of
a juror and these qualities are not limited to persons of any
particular background, training, or education.
97. While precise socio-economic representation on lists of prospec-
tive jurors is not required, see cases cited note 32 supra, and accom-
panying text, the Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory powers
over the federal courts to prevent discrimination against lower socio-
economic classes. In Thiel v. Southern Pac. R.R., 328 U.S. 217 (1946),
a selection system was challenged on the ground that business execu-
tives and persons having the employer's point of view had been pur-
posely selected. The Court stated:
Were we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would en-
courage whatever desires those responsible for the selection ofjury panels may have to discriminate against persons of low
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should also ensure full representation of Negroes on grand jury
venires.
A second practical result of the "personal selection system"
which raises policy questions is that many individuals are re-
peatedly recommended for service. For example, in a recent six
year period, 1961 through 1966, 101 names appeared on the lists of
prospective grand jurors twice, 49 appeared three times, 16 ap-
peared four times, and two were on five of the six lists. Thus,
out of a total of 750 prospective grand jurors for the period, 255
names appeared more than onceY8
There are countervailing considerations that must be evalu-
ated and weighed before repetitious listing of prospective grand
jurors can be condemned. For example, repetitious listing may
manifest in part the laudable desire to obtain well qualified grand
jurors. Certainly such jurors should have an understanding of
the scope and nature of their duties. They should be groomed
to serve intelligently, expertly and cheerfully.9 9 Repetitious list-
ing may in part accomplish these objectives by increasing the
chances that certain individuals of proven ability who are fa-
miliar with the operation of the grand jury will ultimately be
selected to serve on several panels.
The traditional concept of the grand jury as an independent
investigatory and decision-making body must be balanced against
the arguments and objectives described above.100 Surely the
repetitious listing of high socio-economic and possibly prosecu-
tion-oriented prospective grand jurors can only impede that
function.10' In addition, it has been recognized that jury service,
both grand and petit, is the chief remaining governmental func-
tion either directly performed' 02 or indirectly observed by lay
citizens. 0 3  Maximizing the number of persons who have an
opportunity to serve or observe would increase this citizen-law
contact. As a result the public would gain a better understand-
economic and social status. We would breathe life into any
latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the
economically and socially privileged. That we refuse to do.
Id. at 223-24.
98. See Brief for Appellant at 4.
99. See B. BOTEIN, TRiAm JUDGE 210 (1952).
100. See generally Note, Grand Jury, Investigatory Powers and
Limitations, 37 MNN. L. REV. 586 (1953).
101. See note 94 supra, and accompanying text.
102. See C. JOINER, Cmi. JusTic Am THE JURY 77 (1962).
103. See Broeder, supra note 94, at 751, where it is pointed out that
up to 50% of the general public is acquainted with persons who have
rendered jury service.
[Vol. 53:977
JURY SELECTION
ing of the operation of the legal system, and that system, in turn,
would be kept more in tune with the constantly changing
attitudes and mores of the community. 04 On balance, it is sub-
mitted that the considerations against repetitious listing out-
weigh those in favor of it, and that legislative action to curb the
practice would be in order.
Throughout the discussion of sections 593.13 and 593.14, legis-
lative action that would eliminate the ambiguities and discre-
tionary aspects of those statutes has been urged. 0 5 Recently,
the federal government enacted a jury selection statute which
avoids many of the defects of the Minnesota system. 0 6 Thus, an
examination and discussion of that statute will reveal precise
guidelines along which future revision of sections 593.13 and
593.14 could be patterned.
IV. THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT OF 1968
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 represents a
significant departure from previous jury selection procedures in
the federal system.1o7 The declared policy of the Act is to pro-
vide procedures whereby potential jurors will be selected at ran-
dom from a fair cross-section of the community and to ensure
that all qualified citizens have an opportunity to be considered for
grand and petit jury service. 08 In order to accomplish these
objectives the Act specifically prohibits the exclusion of other-
104. See C. JoINER, supra note 102, at 78.
105. For opposite views of the degree of discretion that can safely
be vested in jury selection officials compare Hart, The Case for Federal
Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129, 130 (1967), with Ervin, Jury Reform
Needs More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132, 135 (1967).
106. Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C., ch. 121, §§ 1861-
74 (1968), formerly 62 STAT. 951 (1948), as amended 71 STAT. 638 (1957)
[hereinafter cited only as Act and section number].
107. 28 U.S.C., ch. 121, §§ 1861-71 (1964), had previously controlled
the selection of jurors for the federal courts. Changes in these sec-
tions were recommended in 1960 by the Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
See The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409 (1960). These
recommendations were embodied in Title I of the Civil Rights Act of
1966. See H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1968) [herein-
after cited as H.R. REP. No. 1076]. Although Title I passed the House
in August, 1966, its ultimate adoption was blocked by a Senate filibuster.
See Hart, supra note 105, at 130. The provisions of Title I applicable to
jury selection were identical in terms of objectives and fundamental
principles to those finally embodied in the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968. See H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 3.
108. See Act, § 1861. See also S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 891].
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wise qualified citizens on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.10 9 In addition, the Act pro-
hibits the use of key man selection systems for federal court
jurors.110
Under the Act, a formal written plan of jury selection must
be developed by each judicial district."1 Each plan must be
approved by a panel composed of members of the judicial coun-
cil for the circuit in which the district is located.1 2 While each
district remains free to modify its plan to meet changed con-
ditions, any modifications must be communicated to the super-
visory panel, the Administration Office of the United States
Courts, and the Attorney General of the United States." 3  In
addition, the central feature of each plan must be the random
selection of prospective jurors, which precludes possibilities of
discrimination.114 As a further means of avoiding discrimi-
nation, each plan must specify the source lists from which names
of prospective jurors may be drawn. Voter registration lists are
to be used as the base lists, but other sources also may be used to
ensure that members of the disenfranchised population have the
opportunity to serve as grand or petit jurors.115 Each plan must
set out the mechanical procedures of selecting prospective jurors
109. See Act, § 1862. Former section 1863 had provided that: "No
citizen shall be excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any
court of the United States on account of race or color." For cases
which have precluded discrimination on grounds similar to those con-
tained in present section 1862 see note 24 supra.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 4. See also S. REP. No. 891 at 10-11,
16.
111. See Act, § 1863. See also H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 8; S. REP.
No. 891 at 26-27.
112. See Act, § 1863 (a). See also H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 8, where it
is pointed out that the reviewing panel's function is to determine
whether the formal plan is in compliance with the statutory require-
ments and not to concern itself particularly with the effectiveness of
the plan. See also S. REP. No. 891 at 26.
113. See Act, § 1863(a).
114. Id. H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 4, indicates that random selection was
extended to the initial selection processes in the belief that it would
virtually eliminate the possibility of impermissible discrimination and
arbitrariness at all stages of the jury selection process, and thereby tend
to insure that lists of prospective jurors are drawn from a cross-sec-
tion of the community. See also S. REP. No. 891 at 16.
115. See Act, § 1863(b) (2). See also H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 4, and
S. REP. No. 891 at 16-18, where the use of source lists was described
as follows:
The bill specifies that voter lists be used as the basic source ofjuror names. These lists provide the widest community cross-
section of any list readily available.... [V]oter lists [must]be
supplemented by other sources whenever they do not ade-
quately reflect a cross section of the community.
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from the specified source lists."0 Basic responsibility for man-
aging the selection procedure thus established may be vested
either in a jury commission or in the clerk of the district court." 7
In addition to the general provisions described above, the
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 contains other provisions
which are particularly relevant to the initial selection processes.
For example, sections 1864 and 1865 preclude consideration of an
individual's qualifications until after his name has been drawn
for service and he has furnished specified information relating
to his qualifications.118 Inquiries as to race and occupation may
be made, but the individual need not respond and his failure to
do so will not affect his ability to serve." 9
The Act also provides that an individual can challenge a
particular panel any time before voir dire examination begins
or within seven days after the time he could reasonably have
discovered a substantial failure to comply with the terms of the
Act. 20 At such time, he is given the right to inspect and re-
produce any records and papers of the selection officials that
may be necessary for the preparation of his challenge. 12' Upon
proper challenge, a substantial failure to comply with the Act
will result in a stay of proceedings until a new petit jury panel
is selected. In the case of a grand jury, dismissal of the indict-
116. See Act, § 1863(b) (3).
117. See Act, § 1863(b) (1).
118. See Act, §§ 1864(a), 1865 (a) - (b). Section 1865(b) provides for
disqualification only if the individual whose name is drawn is not a
citizen of the United States; less than 21 years of age; has not resided
in the judicial district for one year; is unable to read, write, and un-
derstand the English language with the degree of proficiency necessary
to fill out the qualification form; is unable to speak English; is in-
capable, because of physical or mental infirmity, of rendering satis-
factory jury service; or has a charge pending against him for the com-
mission of, or has been convicted of, a crime punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been re-
stored by pardon or amnesty.
H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 5 indicates that these are the maximum
qualifications that may be considered. See also Rabinowitz v. United
States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). The legislative intent behind pro-
hibiting consideration of qualifications until after initial selection has
been completed was to prevent consideration of subjective criteria be-
yond the objective standards outlined in the section. H.R. REP. No.
1070 at 5-6; S. REP. No. 891 at 17-18.
119. See Act, § 1869 (h). Such questions are allowed on the grounds
that they may be useful under the local plan of selection provided
they are not inconsistent with the purposes of the act. See H.R. REP.
No. 1076 at 17.
120. See Act, § 1867(a).
121. Id. § 1867(f). This right is of particular value to indigents and
in cases where an extensive examination of venires is required.
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ment may result. 22
The vital significance of the challenge provision and those
which preclude discrimination in the selection process is that
they reduce what may previously have constituted violations of
due process or equal protection to the status of violations of
specific statutory provisions.123 The precise selection guidelines
and the availability of documents should greatly relax the evi-
dentiary burdens that must currently be met to establish vio-
lations of due process and equal protection.
This terse discussion of the Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968 demonstrates that the approach to jury selection re-
flected in the Act is antithetical to the approach presently em-
bodied in sections 593.13 and 593.14 of the Minnesota statutes.
For example, under section 593.13 there is no statutory guarantee
that all the designated source lists from the various govern-
mental subdivisions will be available or used in the selection of
prospective grand and petit jurors. 24 Furthermore, the am-
biguous nature of the selection mechanics set out in the section
permits consideration of irrelevant subjective matters and arbi-
tary exclusion from prospective jury service. 25 Also, under
section 593.14, the procedures employed for selecting prospective
grand and petit jurors for large Mhinesota counties are entirely
discretionary. The resulting opportunities for discrimination
and prejudice in the use of source lists for obtaining petit
jurors,126 and the practical consequences of repetitious listing
and socio-economic imbalance on lists of prospective grand jurors
have been demonstrated. 2T
V. CONCLUSION
The present Minnesota jury selection system and the pro-
cedures that have been established under it could properly be
subjected to further legislative revisions. The provisions of sec-
122. Id. § 1867(a).
123. H.R. REP. No. 1076 at 16, indicates that these provisions elimi-
nate the need to prove prejudice as a condition of judicial intervention
when substantial noncompliance with the Act is established. The preju-
dice requirement was eliminated because the committee felt that it
would unduly burden the procedure for challenging noncompliance.
See notes 11-13 supra, with regard to the requirement of showing preju-
dice to establish a violation of due process.
124. See notes 57-60 supra, and accompanying text.
125. See note 61 supra, and accompanying text.
126. See notes 86-90 supra, and accompanying text.
127. See notes 92-104 supra, and accompanying text.
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tion 593.13 which relate to the use of source lists and the selection
of prospective jurors from those lists should be clarified to elimi-
nate the opportunities for discrimination and prejudice that pres-
ently exist. Section 593.14 should be extensively revised and
the discretionary aspects of that section should be eliminated.
Precise statutory provisions with respect to use of source lists
and random selection would eliminate the opportunities for dis-
crimination and prejudice and the socio-economic imbalance that
currently prevail. The Jury Selection and Service Act can pro-
vide a useful and meaningful guide for these recommended re-
visions of the Minnesota jury selection statutes.
